History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides [best free ebook reader TXT] 📗
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attack from Athens. Yet when I went with the army which I now have to
the relief of Nisaea, the Athenians did not venture to engage me
although in greater force than I; and it is not likely they will
ever send across sea against you an army as numerous as they had at
Nisaea. And for myself, I have come here not to hurt but to free the
Hellenes, witness the solemn oaths by which I have bound my government
that the allies that I may bring over shall be independent; and
besides my object in coming is not by force or fraud to obtain your
alliance, but to offer you mine to help you against your Athenian
masters. I protest, therefore, against any suspicions of my intentions
after the guarantees which I offer, and equally so against doubts of
my ability to protect you, and I invite you to join me without
hesitation.
“Some of you may hang back because they have private enemies, and
fear that I may put the city into the hands of a party: none need be
more tranquil than they. I am not come here to help this party or
that; and I do not consider that I should be bringing you freedom in
any real sense, if I should disregard your constitution, and enslave
the many to the few or the few to the many. This would be heavier than
a foreign yoke; and we Lacedaemonians, instead of being thanked for
our pains, should get neither honour nor glory, but, contrariwise,
reproaches. The charges which strengthen our hands in the war
against the Athenians would on our own showing be merited by
ourselves, and more hateful in us than in those who make no
pretensions to honesty; as it is more disgraceful for persons of
character to take what they covet by fair-seeming fraud than by open
force; the one aggression having for its justification the might which
fortune gives, the other being simply a piece of clever roguery. A
matter which concerns us thus nearly we naturally look to most
jealously; and over and above the oaths that I have mentioned, what
stronger assurance can you have, when you see that our words, compared
with the actual facts, produce the necessary conviction that it is our
interest to act as we say?
“If to these considerations of mine you put in the plea of
inability, and claim that your friendly feeling should save you from
being hurt by your refusal; if you say that freedom, in your
opinion, is not without its dangers, and that it is right to offer
it to those who can accept it, but not to force it on any against
their will, then I shall take the gods and heroes of your country to
witness that I came for your good and was rejected, and shall do my
best to compel you by laying waste your land. I shall do so without
scruple, being justified by the necessity which constrains me,
first, to prevent the Lacedaemonians from being damaged by you,
their friends, in the event of your nonadhesion, through the moneys
that you pay to the Athenians; and secondly, to prevent the Hellenes
from being hindered by you in shaking off their servitude. Otherwise
indeed we should have no right to act as we propose; except in the
name of some public interest, what call should we Lacedaemonians
have to free those who do not wish it? Empire we do not aspire to:
it is what we are labouring to put down; and we should wrong the
greater number if we allowed you to stand in the way of the
independence that we offer to all. Endeavour, therefore, to decide
wisely, and strive to begin the work of liberation for the Hellenes,
and lay up for yourselves endless renown, while you escape private
loss, and cover your commonwealth with glory.”
Such were the words of Brasidas. The Acanthians, after much had been
said on both sides of the question, gave their votes in secret, and
the majority, influenced by the seductive arguments of Brasidas and by
fear for their fruit, decided to revolt from Athens; not however
admitting the army until they had taken his personal security for
the oaths sworn by his government before they sent him out, assuring
the independence of the allies whom he might bring over. Not long
after, Stagirus, a colony of the Andrians, followed their example
and revolted.
Such were the events of this summer. It was in the first days of the
winter following that the places in Boeotia were to be put into the
hands of the Athenian generals, Hippocrates and Demosthenes, the
latter of whom was to go with his ships to Siphae, the former to
Delium. A mistake, however, was made in the days on which they were
each to start; and Demosthenes, sailing first to Siphae, with the
Acarnanians and many of the allies from those parts on board, failed
to effect anything, through the plot having been betrayed by
Nicomachus, a Phocian from Phanotis, who told the Lacedaemonians,
and they the Boeotians. Succours accordingly flocked in from all parts
of Boeotia, Hippocrates not being yet there to make his diversion, and
Siphae and Chaeronea were promptly secured, and the conspirators,
informed of the mistake, did not venture on any movement in the towns.
Meanwhile Hippocrates made a levy in mass of the citizens,
resident aliens, and foreigners in Athens, and arrived at his
destination after the Boeotians had already come back from Siphae, and
encamping his army began to fortify Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo,
in the following manner. A trench was dug all round the temple and the
consecrated ground, and the earth thrown up from the excavation was
made to do duty as a wall, in which stakes were also planted, the
vines round the sanctuary being cut down and thrown in, together
with stones and bricks pulled down from the houses near; every
means, in short, being used to run up the rampart. Wooden towers
were also erected where they were wanted, and where there was no
part of the temple buildings left standing, as on the side where the
gallery once existing had fallen in. The work was begun on the third
day after leaving home, and continued during the fourth, and till
dinnertime on the fifth, when most of it being now finished the army
removed from Delium about a mile and a quarter on its way home. From
this point most of the light troops went straight on, while the
heavy infantry halted and remained where they were; Hippocrates having
stayed behind at Delium to arrange the posts, and to give directions
for the completion of such part of the outworks as had been left
unfinished.
During the days thus employed the Boeotians were mustering at
Tanagra, and by the time that they had come in from all the towns,
found the Athenians already on their way home. The rest of the
eleven Boeotarchs were against giving battle, as the enemy was no
longer in Boeotia, the Athenians being just over the Oropian border,
when they halted; but Pagondas, son of Aeolidas, one of the Boeotarchs
of Thebes (Arianthides, son of Lysimachidas, being the other), and
then commander-in-chief, thought it best to hazard a battle. He
accordingly called the men to him, company after company, to prevent
their all leaving their arms at once, and urged them to attack the
Athenians, and stand the issue of a battle, speaking as follows:
“Boeotians, the idea that we ought not to give battle to the
Athenians, unless we came up with them in Boeotia, is one which should
never have entered into the head of any of us, your generals. It was
to annoy Boeotia that they crossed the frontier and built a fort in
our country; and they are therefore, I imagine, our enemies wherever
we may come up with them, and from wheresoever they may have come to
act as enemies do. And if any one has taken up with the idea in
question for reasons of safety, it is high time for him to change
his mind. The party attacked, whose own country is in danger, can
scarcely discuss what is prudent with the calmness of men who are in
full enjoyment of what they have got, and are thinking of attacking
a neighbour in order to get more. It is your national habit, in your
country or out of it, to oppose the same resistance to a foreign
invader; and when that invader is Athenian, and lives upon your
frontier besides, it is doubly imperative to do so. As between
neighbours generally, freedom means simply a determination to hold
one’s own; and with neighbours like these, who are trying to enslave
near and far alike, there is nothing for it but to fight it out to the
last. Look at the condition of the Euboeans and of most of the rest of
Hellas, and be convinced that others have to fight with their
neighbours for this frontier or that, but that for us conquest means
one frontier for the whole country, about which no dispute can be
made, for they will simply come and take by force what we have. So
much more have we to fear from this neighbour than from another.
Besides, people who, like the Athenians in the present instance, are
tempted by pride of strength to attack their neighbours, usually march
most confidently against those who keep still, and only defend
themselves in their own country, but think twice before they grapple
with those who meet them outside their frontier and strike the first
blow if opportunity offers. The Athenians have shown us this
themselves; the defeat which we inflicted upon them at Coronea, at the
time when our quarrels had allowed them to occupy the country, has
given great security to Boeotia until the present day. Remembering
this, the old must equal their ancient exploits, and the young, the
sons of the heroes of that time, must endeavour not to disgrace
their native valour; and trusting in the help of the god whose
temple has been sacrilegiously fortified, and in the victims which
in our sacrifices have proved propitious, we must march against the
enemy, and teach him that he must go and get what he wants by
attacking someone who will not resist him, but that men whose glory it
is to be always ready to give battle for the liberty of their own
country, and never unjustly to enslave that of others, will not let
him go without a struggle.”
By these arguments Pagondas persuaded the Boeotians to attack the
Athenians, and quickly breaking up his camp led his army forward, it
being now late in the day. On nearing the enemy, he halted in a
position where a hill intervening prevented the two armies from seeing
each other, and then formed and prepared for action. Meanwhile
Hippocrates at Delium, informed of the approach of the Boeotians, sent
orders to his troops to throw themselves into line, and himself joined
them not long afterwards, leaving about three hundred horse behind him
at Delium, at once to guard the place in case of attack, and to
watch their opportunity and fall upon the Boeotians during the battle.
The Boeotians placed a detachment to deal with these, and when
everything was arranged to their satisfaction appeared over the
hill, and halted in the order which they had determined on, to the
number of seven thousand heavy infantry, more than ten thousand
light troops, one thousand horse, and five hundred targeteers. On
their right were the Thebans and those of their province, in the
centre the Haliartians, Coronaeans, Copaeans, and the other people
around the lake, and on the left the Thespians, Tanagraeans, and
Orchomenians, the cavalry and the light troops
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